Photo : FGS Elbe comes alongside FGS Nerz during Baltic Operations © U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, 2009
Due to its multirole capability and political symbolism, the Navy has traditionally reflected Germany’s foreign policy and international strategy in the broadest sense, in that it has in recent decades consistently been deployed as a first option. From a tactical point of view, and in view of the evolution of military operations known as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), naval support for land forces goes well beyond amphibious landings and takes on a new dimension that is increasingly wide-ranging, complex and essential to the smooth running of joint manoeuvres, whether in terms of support and logistics, force protection, but also C2, connectivity, targeting, cyber and intelligence.
Judging German Strategy by how it uses the Navy: On strategy, foreign policy and the navy’s contribution to Germany’s global responsibility
By Dr. Moritz Brake
Judging by how it deploys and financially prioritises its armed forces – especially its navy, the scope of Germany’s strategic perspective appears to have shifted considerably from global, broad and maritime towards a much more regional and continental outlook. Because of its versatility and broad political utility, the navy traditionally is the armed service most closely aligned with foreign policy and overall grand strategy. For the past over thirty years, the German Navy has been a “chancellor’s instrument” in its international deployments.
Therefore, seeing the commitment of the near-entirety of the fleet to the North and Baltic Sea for the foreseeable future, is a strong indicator of where Germany sets its international and strategic priorities.
The available ships of the German Navy are focused on deterring foreign aggression and supporting alliance solidarity in the North and Baltic Seas, the so-called “Northern Flank” in NATO’s defence strategy. With the current low fleet strength, the Navy has hardly any room for manoeuvre in the coming years for a presence in the world beyond home waters. As an additional clear sign of the regional orientation of Germany’s defence policy, the navy comes off very badly in the distribution of the €100 billion “Sondervermögen”, the special budget allocated to the Bundeswehr as part of Chancellor Scholz’ Zeitenwende.
A short-term concentration on the European continent certainly makes sense for the Bundeswehr’s land and air forces, but it is a different story for the Navy. Naval forces are a globally deployable, flexible instrument of foreign policy. They can support a wide range of political goals with military missions, representation, humanitarian aid and constabulary functions. A ship with the same equipment and crew can seamlessly switch between all these tasks.
Without Germany’s contribution, European seapower is unthinkable. At the moment, therefore, there is a need for a real division of labour in the military sector in Germany: the Army and Air force focus on continental deterrence in Europe, while the Navy keeps an eye on the world and flanks German and European foreign policy.
Warships are an internationally visible sign of commitment and capacity to act. The German Foreign Office has also valued them for decades – not only as platforms for prestigious receptions in foreign ports. Within weeks, one and the same ship can reach and represent the most distant places in the world, rescue refugees from the sea, fight piracy or confront other aggressors. This involves relatively little financial, political and military risk.
Naval ships tie up only slightly more budgetary resources in the Indian Ocean than in home waters – and fly the flag for Germany and Europe in regions relevant to foreign policy. Moreover, with their modern weapon systems, they are very resilient and offer the possibility of being deployed for longer periods of time far from home, largely self-sufficiently for weeks – with only occasional logistical port visits.
The Navy as an Indicator of how Germans see the Military Element of National Strategy
In the three decades since the end of the Cold War, Germany has come to appreciate the value of the Navy as an instrument of foreign policy. From a point where Chancellor Helmut Kohl simply forgot about the Navy and its share in overall Bundeswehr force-levels in the Two-Plus-Four Treaties (the Army and Air forces then had to “give up” a share from their future head-count), it soon developed into an important military alternative to “boots on the ground” – as in the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
Shortly before the transition to the new millennium, then Finance Minister Hans Eichel flirted with abolishing the navy for cost reasons during the period of the “peace dividend”. But already in the reaction to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used the Navy in particular as a means of sending a visible signal of alliance solidarity in the American “war on terror”. With the largest fleet to leave German home waters since the Kaiser’s Imperial cruiser squadrons, the navy participated in the joint presence at the Horn of Africa. he Navy’s visible presence and ability to act alongside America and the other allies in the Indian Ocean was an important contribution to the legroom Schröder needed to be able to say “no” to participation in the Iraq war in 2003 without major foreign policy damage.
For Chancellor Angela Merkel, the Navy also repeatedly offered the opportunity to show strong foreign policy commitment. For example, in the Middle East conflict – within the framework of the UNIFIL blue helmet mission off the coast of Lebanon since 2006 – warships were also the solution to the dilemma that German peacekeepers could have faced on land between the mission’s mandate, Hezbollah and Israeli forces. In addition, the mission in the eastern Mediterranean offered the chance to counter the louder calls of the allies for the Bundeswehr to participate in combat operations in southern Afghanistan which were causing heavy losses. It was not until the Navy, with almost 1,000 soldiers, had taken over leadership of the maritime peacekeeping mission that the German government officially rejected the allies’ call for increased military involvement in Afghanistan.
At least since Schröder’s chancellorship, the federal governments seemed to have internalised the credo of former Chief of the Navy Lutz Feldt: “Whenever the use of military means seems to be called for, examine the naval option first”. From fighting piracy at the Horn of Africa, protecting sea lanes, the basis of a globalised world economy important for all humanity, to rescuing refugees in the Mediterranean, the value of the Navy has always been greater than in just addressing the specific task at hand. In the financial crisis of 2008, the EU needed clear signals of internal solidarity and capacity to act – its ships in the “Atalanta” mission off the Horn of Africa were exactly that. In the 2015 “refugee crisis”, Europe threatened to break apart again – and ultimately lost Britain. That’s when a joint EU naval mission – “Sophia” – in the Mediterranean was an effective measure, saving thousands of people, while managing to equally placate those among the member-states and citizens, who focussed on humanitarian aid and those who leaned towards a “Fortress Europe”-approach to migration.
New Threats and Broad Responsibilities
Germany has to come to terms with the reality that strategic competition between great powers in the 21st century still includes the military dimension – and beyond this, encompasses all factors that have the potential to influence modern societies. This, in essence, is what “Zeitenwende” is about, the realisation that adversaries exist in international relations and that they are willing to exploit weaknesses across the board – including with military force – to challenge the position, influence, prosperity and even liberty of Germany and its allies.
Pipelines, undersea data cables, offshore wind farms, oil and gas rigs as well as ports and ships are indispensable in their contribution to modern societies in Europe and beyond – and they need to be protected. Who, if not the Navies – including Germany’s – will provide the capabilities to protect maritime critical infrastructure? Germany is however hampered in its response by overlapping federal and regional authorities. Additionally, the Navy which has the capabilities to address the broadest range of threats – including under water, lacks the numbers in ships and personnel to cover the growing need to secure broad national and common interests at sea.
The disparity between the size of the task and the availability of resources to address it, leads to necessary but painful prioritisation – not just, but visibly so, for the German Navy. With a minuscule amount of the extraordinary budget of one hundred billion euros allocated to the navy, and deficits in ammunition, spare parts and above all personnel, the navy doesn’t just need more ships, it needs more of everything. At the same time, efficiency in using what resources are there, is a that much more critical factor in the navy’s utility for German foreign policy. The Navy needs to be used where the gains compared to the invested effort are expected to be highest – or the dangers averted and risks managed are greatest.
A Limited Strategic Perspective Comes at a Price
The special value of the Navy as an instrument of foreign policy is also evident in national and alliance defence. The signs in the Bundeswehr seem to point to continental deterrence, just as they did during the Cold War. The Army traditionally dominates the strategic culture in the Ministry of Defence due to its sheer mass. This perhaps explains the current German strategy of focusing only on the continental part for itself and its contribution within a globally thinking, maritime NATO. However, this approach comes at a high price:
Germany deprives itself of one of its most important instruments of global presence and ability to act if the Navy is tied up in Europe with almost all its available forces to protect the northern flank of continental defence.
At a time when Europe’s energy supply comes almost exclusively by sea and passes through major maritime trouble spots, the danger of interrupting these vital supply lines must be countered with effective measures. Ideally, the clear signal of a presence capable of taking action will prevent escalation in the first place. But simply trusting that others will fix it, or that piracy will not flare up again in the Horn of Africa, that the Gulf of Guinea will stabilise and that shipping will not be obstructed in the Strait of Hormuz, is very risky.
In contrast to the Army on operational deployment in the last decades, the Navy is not prevented from switching to other roles by sending it on one specific mission. When it is deployed, it often even gains additional value with advanced geographical position in order to be able to react to unforeseen events in other places. The combat supply ship “Berlin”, for example, deployed to the Horn of Africa in 2004/2005 as part of the anti-terrorism mission “Enduring Freedom” and was already ‘halfway there’ from a German perspective to provide emergency aid in the tsunami disaster that struck Southeast Asia at the time. With its on-board hospital, the large cargo capacity for emergency supplies, for the production of fresh water and the two transport helicopters available, Germany was able to help substantially and quickly.
To this day, the rescue of many people in Indonesia is highly credited to Germany in this important region of the world.
If the German Navy remains in its home waters, it will be missing in the world. As an example, South Africa which was once a very close partner of Germany and its Navy tends today to cooperate and exercise militarily with other strategic competitors. Almost the entire modern South African fleet comes from German shipyards, and until 2015 the German Navy regularly exercised with the South African Navy.
Since 2015, Germany has no longer had the vessels needed to maintain cooperation due to other commitments, and so others have taken over. The situation would be similar in the UNIFIL mission in the Mediterranean today, as other nations are ready to fill the German role in the eastern Mediterranean should the Navy really withdraw to the Baltic Sea, as is widely discussed at the moment.
Charting the Course Beyond the Ukraine War
It is an opportunity for the Federal Republic that the new as-yet unpublished National Security Strategy is being issued under the auspices of the Federal Foreign Office.There, the special value of the navy as a flexible political instrument is increasingly being recognised. Ultimately, the utility of the Navy is about much more than purely military contributions to only a regionally and operationally limited part of the overall strategic challenge.
For this reason, Germany – and its Navy – have responsibilities far beyond the defence against a military threat close to home. The Ukraine War is leading to an increase in hunger, economic hardship and instability in many other places in the world. Germany and Europe need to show their concern and act in their own and humanity’s common interest. This means that the navy is in demand right now to fly the flag for Germany and its allies, lend its flexible ability to act to make a valuable contribution to foreign policy, and demonstrate clearly that Germany’s responsibility is global.