Photo © U.S. National Guard, Spc. Amy Carle, U.S. – Ukrainian joint training, Yavoriv, Ukraine, 2018
Military Training: A Reversal In Traditional Relationships
This third part highlights a particularly interesting aspect of the transformation previously described: the reversal of traditional relationships in the field of military training.
In light of the combat effectiveness of Ukrainian innovations, Western armed forces now appear to position themselves as much as learners as instructors—seeking to learn from and adapt the military techniques developed under the constant pressures of the battlefield.
The shift from being a recipient of training to becoming a provider of expertise represents in itself a fundamental change in the traditional paradigm of military education as practiced for decades.
Western armed forces are thus striving to draw lessons from the Ukrainian experience and integrate them into their own operations, both nationally and within military alliances such as NATO, notably through the creation of the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) (1).
In the United States in particular, military leadership has acknowledged that Ukrainian innovations in drone warfare represent a significant advance in comparison with existing American military doctrine and capabilities (2).
According to some analysts, the degree to which these lessons are being integrated into U.S. military training and planning constitutes a major departure from traditional approaches to innovation within the U.S. armed forces.
The U.S. Army has, in fact, initiated specific programs to study Ukrainian drone warfare tactics and develop American adaptations of combat-proven techniques. These programs even employ Ukrainian military personnel as instructors and advisors—thus inverting the long-standing relationship in which U.S. instructors traditionally trained foreign forces (3).
Similar programs have been established by other NATO allies, each seeking to understand and adapt Ukrainian innovations to their own operational requirements and military cultures. The process of knowledge transfer has involved not only tactical techniques, but also the innovative mindset and rapid adaptability that underpinned Ukraine’s success.
Various practical training programs have therefore been set up in which Ukrainian military personnel directly train Western soldiers in drone warfare techniques. These programs cover not only the technical aspects of drone operation but also tactical integration, rapid innovation processes, and battlefield adaptation methods that have proven critical to Ukrainian success (4).
Training also emphasizes the cultural and organizational changes required to support rapid innovation in military operations. Traditional military organizations—focused on optimization, standardization, and predictability—have had to adapt to introduce the flexibility and creativity necessary for effective drone warfare.
Beyond tactical training, the knowledge transfer has included significant technological “sharing and pooling” with collaborative development programs.
Western defense industries now work directly with Ukrainian innovators to understand their technical solutions and develop enhanced systems based on combat-proven concepts (5).
This collaboration has accelerated the development of Western military drone capabilities by providing real-world performance insights and operational feedback—data that would otherwise have taken years to gather through traditional military research programs.
Beyond Drones: A Crucial Feedback Loop for Acquisition Processes
Beyond drone-related lessons learned, the Ukrainian experience carries profound implications for understanding modern warfare and military innovation more broadly.
These lessons challenge a number of fundamental assumptions about military capability, technological advantage, and the very nature of warfare.
First, the Ukrainian experience has shown how commercial technology has democratized military capabilities that were once reserved to major powers.
Small armed forces with limited resources can now achieve significant capabilities through the creative adaptation of readily available technologies (6).
Such a democratization has implications for international security, military planning, and defense spending priorities. Traditional measures of military power—based on costly, specialized equipment—may be less relevant in conflicts where the innovative use of commercial technology can deliver similar or even superior results.
The rapid pace of innovation achieved by Ukrainian forces under combat conditions thus fundamentally challenges traditional military R&D approaches, in which long and costly development programs appear less effective than rapid prototyping and field testing under real operational conditions.
Many analysts therefore believe that military organizations may now—more than ever—need to develop new approaches to innovation, focusing on speed, flexibility, and continuous adaptation rather than extensive planning and standardized solutions (7).
What was once exceptional—or aspirational—may, out of necessity, become the new standard.
The Ukrainian experience thus underscores the importance of organizational culture and structure in enabling rapid innovation. Military institutions optimized for standardization and hierarchical control may struggle to adapt to operational environments demanding constant innovation and tactical agility—often reliant on individual initiative.
Integrating civilian expertise, commercial technology, and non-traditional approaches to military problems requires organizational changes that have begun within many defense institutions but are often more difficult to implement than it seems.
The Challenge of Sustainable Large-Scale Military Production
While Ukrainian innovations in drone warfare have proven remarkably effective, they also face significant challenges and limitations that must be taken into account in any lessons-learned analysis.
First, it must be remembered that many Ukrainian innovations were designed for specific operational contexts and may therefore be ill-suited to different environments or to coalitions operating within larger military organizations.
Scaling up innovations from small units to large-scale military capabilities requires not only further development but also institutional adaptation.
The sustainability of rapid innovation under combat conditions also deserves closer scrutiny: it is clear that the high operational tempo and resource constraints that drove innovation may not be sustainable over prolonged periods or across different operational contexts.
Second, the “action–reaction” cycle between adversaries has accelerated—drone warfare in Ukraine being a perfect example.
The effectiveness of drone warfare techniques depends largely on the countermeasures available to adversarial forces. As electronic warfare capabilities improve and specific anti-drone technologies are developed, many once-proven tactics can quickly become obsolete on the battlefield (8).
This continuous arms race and technological competition between drone capabilities and countermeasures represent a persistent challenge requiring constant vigilance and adaptability.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that, despite their relative cost-efficiency compared with traditional military systems, large-scale drone operations still demand significant resources in terms of equipment, training, maintenance, and operational support. The apparent simplicity of individual or combined drone missions conceals the complex logistical and organizational requirements needed to sustain them over time and ultimately achieve victory.
In conclusion, while the Ukrainian experience illustrates a historic reversal of relationships in the field of military training—where practical innovations born of operational necessity have outpaced traditional theoretical approaches—, it also demonstrates that modern military effectiveness depends as much on rapid adaptability and continuous innovation as on the possession of advanced technological equipment.
(By Murielle Delaporte)
Notes and references
(1) OTAN, Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), 2025 (https://www.act.nato.int/jatec/)
See also the interview with General Philippe Lavigne, former SACT (Supreme Allied Commander Transformation) and originator of the JATEC concept:
“The lessons learned from Ukraine have shown that within an organization — especially one with thirty-two members — there are already numerous links, but very often these links are bilateral: the British with Ukraine, the Estonians with Ukraine, and so on. While each draws a number of lessons, NATO as a whole until now only had a fragmented vision, preventing us from learning as much as we could in order to act faster.
Hence the creation of a new center in Poland — the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Center (JATEC) — on which SACT worked extensively and which was inaugurated last February.
Systematically drawing lessons in a very short feedback loop from the Ukrainian battlefield — whether these lessons are tactical, technological, related to training and education, or even to civilian infrastructure or energy resilience — all of this contributes to ACT’s primary mission, which is to ‘return to designing the force of tomorrow to protect against Russia.’
In this sense, designing tomorrow’s Ukrainian army constitutes a true test of NATO’s ability to adapt.”
(Published in Best OPS 2025 and online: Operationnels.com – June 24, 2025)
(2) Defense One, “Ukraine’s Daring Drone Raid Exposes American Vulnerabilities,” June 5, 2025; CSIS, “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” July 17, 2025; CNN, “U.S. Drone Dilemma: Why the Most Advanced Military in the World Is Playing Catch-Up on the Modern Battlefield,” September 15, 2025.
(3) Defense One, “At Army’s Special-Ops School, the Biggest Changes in a Generation,” April 24, 2024; Military Review, “Leveraging the Ukraine Experience,” March-April 2025.
(4) NATO JATEC, Structure and Activities, 2025 (ibid); Military Review, “Leveraging the Ukraine Experience,” March-April 2025 (ibid).
(5) CSIS, “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” July 17, 2025; ECFR, “Drones in Ukraine: Four Lessons for the West,” January 9, 2025.
(6) ECFR, “Drones in Ukraine: Four Lessons for the West,” January 9, 2025; Defense One, “Ukraine’s Daring Drone Raid Exposes American Vulnerabilities,” June 5, 2025.
(7) (CSIS, “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” July 17, 2025; AUSA, “The Russo-Ukrainian War: Protracted Warfare Implications for the U.S. Army,” November 17, 2024.
(8) CSIS, “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” July 17, 2025; ECFR, “Drones in Ukraine: Four Lessons for the West,” January 9, 2025; U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Department of Defense Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” March 30, 2025.