Photo © https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mechanized_infantrymen_of_the_Ukrainian_150th_Brigade_during_infantry_training.jpg
The relationship between Ukraine and Western military forces presents one of the most remarkable reversals in modern military training partnerships.
From 2014 to 2021, Western forces, particularly those of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, massively invested in training Ukrainian military personnel in conventional warfare tactics, NATO standards, and modern military doctrine.
Today, just a few years later, the roles have dramatically reversed: Ukrainian forces are now training military personnel from other nations – notably American military personnel – in revolutionary battlefield drone tactics they developed out of necessity during their ongoing conflict with Russia.
This transformation represents far more than a simple exchange of tactical knowledge. It highlights fundamental changes in how military innovation occurs, in the evolution of warfare itself, and in how traditional hierarchies of military expertise are challenged by the democratizing effects of contemporary technology and the crucible of combat experience.
The evolution of the Ukrainian army from recipient of Western training to innovator and trainer thus offers new perspectives on modern warfare, technological adaptation, and the very nature of military learning.
This three-part article examines this evolution by starting with the foundations: the Western training programs that shaped, between 2014 and 2021, the first milestones of a modernized Ukrainian army.
Part I. The Foundations: Western Military Training in Ukraine (2014-2021)
The initial phase of Western military involvement in Ukraine began primarily following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces were then largely organized around Soviet-era doctrine, equipment, and command structures that had remained largely unchanged since independence in 1991.
Western military advisors thus identified a number of areas requiring modernization to bring Ukrainian forces up to contemporary standards.
Operation Unifier, Canada’s military training mission, notably began in 2015 and focused on developing Ukrainian capabilities in areas including weapons handling training, explosive and ammunition neutralization, military medical training, and communications.
The program emphasized small unit tactics, defensive operations, and the development of a professional non-commissioned officer corps – a concept largely absent from Soviet military tradition but fundamental to Western military effectiveness.
Similarly, the United States established the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) and conducted training through various programs including the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. American instructors worked to reform Ukrainian military education, improve logistical systems, and introduce modern battle management practices. The emphasis was on conventional warfare scenarios, with an emphasis on combined arms operations, urban warfare, and counterinsurgency tactics learned from American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
British forces were also very active, notably with Operation Orbital, providing training in areas including cybersecurity, medical training, and logistics. The program also emphasized the development of military leadership and the establishment of professional military education institutions modeled on Western standards.
Ukraine also successfully applied NATO’s Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) by building comprehensive societal resilience – combining civilian preparedness, government continuity, and coordinated civil-military structures – to resist aggression and maintain national resistance under occupation threats.
These training programs, costing millions of dollars in investment and thousands of hours of instruction, succeeded in modernizing many aspects of Ukrainian military operations while establishing the professional foundations that proved crucial later.
Nevertheless, this training was largely theoretical, based on Western military doctrine developed for different operational environments and types of conflicts.
Western approach to military training traditionally follows established models: major military powers with extensive resources, advanced technology, and recent combat experience share their knowledge with smaller allies or partners.
This model had worked effectively in many contexts, from rebuilding European militaries after World War II to training allied forces during the Cold War and beyond.
The Need to Revolutionize the Acquisition Process to Keep Pace with Accelerated Operational Tempo
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created an entirely different operational environment from what had been anticipated during the previous years of Western training.
Ukrainian forces found themselves facing a numerically superior enemy with significant advantages in conventional military materiel, including tanks, aircraft, long-range artillery, and missile systems.
Traditional Western military doctrine, while valuable, proved insufficient against the unique challenges Ukraine faced.
The asymmetric nature of the conflict – a smaller force defending against a larger invader – required creative solutions that maximized available resources while minimizing exposure to superior enemy firepower.
Ukrainian military leaders, many of whom had indeed benefited from Western training, had to quickly adapt and innovate in real-time under combat conditions. This environment proved to be an unprecedented laboratory for military innovation.
Unlike most Western armed forces, which have become accustomed to taking years, even decades, to develop, test, and refine new technologies and tactics, Ukrainian forces had only weeks, at best months, to identify problems, develop solutions, and implement them on the battlefield.
The traditional military research and development cycle was sometimes compressed from several years to a few days.
The democratization of technology played a crucial role in this innovation. Commercial drones, initially developed for photography, agriculture, and recreation, are readily available and relatively inexpensive, while consumer electronics, communication systems, and computing power that would have been exclusively military just a few decades ago are now accessible to any military force with modest financial resources.
Ukrainian forces thus succeeded in adapting these commercial technologies for military purposes with remarkable creativity and effectiveness. The pressure of combat, combined with the intelligence and individual initiative of fighters and their leaders, created an innovation ecosystem heralding a new era in modern warfare.
The example of drones is the most well-known and significant (see Part II of this article).
(By Murielle Delaporte)
To Go Further:
1. Gouvernement du Canada, « Opération UNIFIER », Ministère de la Défense nationale, 2023 ; UK Ministry of Defence, « Operation Orbital: UK Training Mission in Ukraine », 2022.
2. Adamsky, Dmitry, « The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel », Stanford University Press, 2010.
3. Larrabee, Stephen F., « Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics », Journal of International Affairs, vol. 63, n° 2, 2010, pp. 33-52.
4. Boulègue, Mathieu, « Ukraine’s Quest for Mature Security and Defence Sector Governance », Chatham House Research Paper, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2018.
5. Gouvernement du Canada, « L’opération UNIFIER : Mission d’instruction militaire du Canada en Ukraine », Ministère de la Défense nationale, mise à jour 2023.
6. Colson, Thomas, « Réformer les forces armées post-soviétiques : L’exemple ukrainien », Revue Défense Nationale, n° 785, décembre 2015, pp. 45-52.
7. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, « Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine Fact Sheet », 2022.
8. Pion-Berlin, David, et Harold Trinkunas, « Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America », Latin American Research Review, vol. 42, n° 3, 2007, pp. 76-100 (pour un contexte comparatif sur les programmes de formation militaire internationale)
9. UK Ministry of Defence, « Operation Orbital: Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine », Defence Equipment & Support, 2019.
10. OTAN, « Concept opérationnel de résistance », Commandement de la transformation alliée, 2019 ; voir aussi Tardy, Thierry, « La résilience : un nouveau paradigme de sécurité », IFRI Focus Stratégique, n° 91, janvier 2019.
11. Massicot, Dara, « Anticipating a New Russian Military Doctrine in 2020: What It Might Contain and Why It Matters », War on the Rocks, 2019.
12. Biddle, Stephen, « Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle », Princeton University Press, 2004.
13. Galeotti, Mark, « The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War », Yale University Press, 2022.
14. International Institute for Strategic Studies, « The Military Balance 2023 », Routledge, 2023 ; voir aussi Boulegue, Mathieu, « The Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine », Chatham House Expert Comment, février 2022.
15. Arreguín-Toft, Ivan, « How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict », Cambridge University Press, 2005.
16. Rosen, Stephen Peter, « Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military », Cornell University Press, 1991.
17. Dombrowski, Peter, et Eugene Gholz, « Buying Military Transformation: Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry », Columbia University Press, 2006.
18. Chamayou, Grégoire, « Théorie du drone », La Fabrique éditions, 2013 ; voir aussi Zajec, Olivier, « Introduction à la géostratégie », Éditions du Rocher, 2020, chapitre sur les technologies duales.
19. Murray, Williamson, et Allan R. Millett (dir.), « Military Innovation in the Interwar Period », Cambridge University Press, 1996 ; pour une perspective française, voir Henrotin, Joseph, « Techno-guérilla et guerre hybride : Le pire des mondes ? », Nuvis, 2014.