In Brief – By Murielle Delaporte –
This hearing focused on a dual theme, namely the Military Program Law and the war in Ukraine, and detailed the context of the debates and the reasoning underlying the development of this LPM set at 413 billion Euros as well as the transformation of the structure of the French armed forces, which purpose is to enable “France to face new threats and to maintain its ranking among leading world powers”. [1].
A Summary of the French Armed Forces Minister’s Hearing before the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on February 28th, 2023 on the following subject: Military Program Law and The War In Ukraine
While the next military program law (LPM for « Loi de programmation militaire ») is set at 413 billion Euros, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, described where the LPM stands today and outlined the latter’s priorities before the Senators of the Commission of the armed forces on February 28th. He emphasized that the process is on schedule since the main strategic axes have been defined by the President of the Republic during his speech at the French Air Force Base of Mont de Marsan on January 20th.
In the background of this LPM is the concern to be able to fight on all fronts in order to anticipate threats, without getting exhausted and while getting more mass and density. As President Emmanuel Macron declared in Mont de Marsan: “ One of the traps to avoid is to exhaust oneself by seeking only technological sophistication, the other is not to invest [dans] in these new means. (…). The 2019-2025 military program law had a clear vocation: to fix our armed forces, to give them the breath and the means, to get them out of the logic of shortage and to find leverages for action. (…) The new military program law intends to continue and amplify such a surge capacity. Basically, after fixing the armed forces, we will transform them. We must spare the time separatings us from tomorrow’s conflict.»[2]
In his introductory remarks, Sébastien Lecornu did indeed highlight the fact that the government intended not to craft yet another Defense White Paper, which “too often, has unfortunately served to disguise or make do with cuts in budget appropriations”.
As a basis for this LPM, the government ” did not start from a graph curve, but from lessons learned ” from Ukraine, as well as from the fight against terrorism in Africa. The task has been to reassess the model of our armed forces in regard to the evolution of the threat by 2040, while remaining humble given the difficulty of such an exercise.
“ These 413 million Euros are in fact a wall that we have built from the ground floor while asking ourselves the question of what needs to be fixed, or remains to be fixed, (…) while identifying what we need in order to be able to keep our projection capabilities “, he explained.
The Minister rejected any comparison between France and Ukraine, as made by some French analysts: as a starter, “ France is a country located to the west of NATO he said, and the bias of drawing conclusions based on what is happening in Ukraine “pollutes the debate” “. Each security situation has its particularities and France cannot be compared to the United Kingdom or Germany either, he recalled in his preamble.
The Minister of the Armed Forces also answered many detailed questions by the Senators in a spirit of openness and conciliation, reflecting the spirit of national unity one could expect for given the events in Ukraine. Reasoning in terms of the number of days one could fight means reintroducing the debates of the 1960s when the French nuclear deterrent was taking its first steps.
Here are a few highlights:
1- France is protected by a “nuclear vault”, which nevertheless requires attention
For the minister of the Armed Forces, the government has a “generational responsibility” to modernize the nuclear component and deterrence, insofar as most of the decisions that affect the French population today date back fifteen years. “Decisions taken today will affect generations to come in the same way, whether it concerns launchers, warheads or specific investments made within the Military Applications Division[du Commissariat à l’énergie atomique], the French Navy or the Strategic Air Forces. »
Echoing certain criticisms, he argued that the French nuclear singularity is in no way a “Maginot line”, as it does work. French nuclear deterrence contributes to that of NATO and strengthened its credibility, the minister also stressed out in response to questions from Parliamentarians.
Nuclear deterrence does not however constitute a magic wand against all threats, as “new areas of conflict are emerging under the nuclear vault”, e.g. space, seabed, or cyber.
The nuclear question also raises the fundamental reflection about strategic autonomy, sovereignty and alliances. It is necessary to sort out “what we must do alone, what we want to do alone, and what we can share“, in terms of industrial capacities or planning instruments at the multilateral or bilateral levels. The French model for its armed forces does depend on this question.
For Sébastien Lecornu, questioning France’s membership to NATO as some political parties do, is irrelevant, as France is one of its founding members. It is on the contrary important to reaffirm it, as well as the fact that “ France is not isolated strategically-speaking ”. This does not however preclude the ability to distinguish between what NATO can and what it cannot do in other parts of the world.
2. Ten modernization priorities
Underlining the importance of conventional means required to support this nuclear vault, Sébastien Lecornu has then identified ten priorities in terms of modernization:
- Intelligence – essential for Deterrence, the war against terrorism and anticipation in a tense strategic context – will benefit from a 60% budget increase in favor of its three major directorates: the DRSD (“Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité de la Défense”, i.e. the Defence Intelligence and Security Directorate, the DRM (“Direction du renseignement militaire”, i.e. the Military Intelligence Directorate) – to which the Minister paid tribute by emphasizing the “fabulous leap forward” in terms of the gains in situational awareness achieved since the first Gulf War – and the DGSE (“Direction générale du renseignement extérieur”, i.e. the General Directorate for External Security). Such an effort to continue to imporve our intelligence capabilities are all the more important that the services have been mainly focusing over the past years on the fight against terrorism.
- Drones (which include loitering munitions) must be the focus of attention in terms of funding and research. Indeed it is not enough to close an unacceptable gap, but it is necessary to make a technological leap in order to meet the challenges we shall be facing in 2030-2035. This is true for all the services and “a sum of five billion Euros will be dedicated” to the task.
- Ground/Surface-to-air defense: if there is a major lesson learned from the conflict in Ukraine, it is that ground-to-air defense should no longer be neglected, as it is inseparable from deterrence itself. “[Système sol-air moyenne portée Nouvelle Génération]”, said the Minister.
- Overseas capabilities must be enhanced whether on land, air or sea-based, without forgetting innovation and space issues: indeed, “space assets are especially crucial in these parts of the world where distances are especially challenging”.
- Cyber needs to be clearly defined, since it touches upon both technology and doctrine, while raising the question of subsidiarity given its impact on sovereignty. First of all, it is necessary to be able to identify the origin of the attacks (develop “a kind of judiciary police”), as cybercriminality must be differentiated according to the type of targets affected. You also have to be able to hinder and to put an end to attacks, and, thirdly, you have to be able to counter-attack for the sake of “cyber self-defense”. The current challenge in France is the creation of human resources due to the lack of sufficient courses in the field of cyber and electronic warfare (including in high-ranking universities such as Polytechnique).
- – The protection of the Seabed: “the sixth “patch” [for modernization] “concerns the seabed, in the Overseas Territories, but not only“. The protection of the seabed is now called into question, as we can see in the conflict in Ukraine (protection of pipelines for example). We need to put an end to access denial. This involves mine warfare, as well as deep water robotic capabilities “up to six thousand meter deep”.
- The space sector is also significantly behind in all areas, whether in terms of launchers or whatever means we sent into space – “ what we do on earth in connection to space and what we do from and in space” -. In order to catch up, “an ambitious copy is also in progress” in that new battlefield.
- The Special forceswere praised by the Minister for their courage: “joint and the first to march” , they “command the respect of all”, he said, while condemning the lack of capabilities as far as individual equipment are concerned, but also in terms of means of transport (particularly helicopters).
- The field of ammunition, one of the central elements of the surge in industrial defense capacities towards a “war economy”, is being supported by new acquisitions and reshoring, such as the reshoring of the production of powder in Bergerac, a “first concrete decision” in sight.
- Support as a whole must continue to be strengthened beyond the current “repair LPM” with particular emphasis on the Armed Forces Health Service (SSA in French for “Service de santé des Armées”) and its military field hospitals, for which a specific roadmap must be dedicated. “What I say for the SSA is also valid for the SCA’s administrative services (“Service du commissariat des Armées”), for the SEO’s energy support (“Service de l’énergie opérationnelle”) or even for the SID’s infrastructure missions (“Service d’infratrsucture de la défense”) …”, specified the minister. The budget allocated to the maintenance of equipment should increase by 40% from 35 to 49 billion Euros.
3. A Procurement First for a long time
Expenses related to Ukraine (excluding maintenance on the theater) will be excluded from the LPM in order to be more transparent.
4. Simplifying Processes
The presence of French military forces in Africa is currently reexamined at the request of President Macron, reflecting the will, growth and new needs of the host countries. The situation of each partner country (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Chad, Niger, Djibouti) is different with bilateral relations based either on training missions exclusively, or on training and intervention missions (as in Chad and Ivory Coast). The idea is to “be present differently” at the request of the sovereign countries with which France is allied and whose armed forces have grown a lot in recent decades, recalled the minister, standing up against critics castigating a departure of France” from Africa
” There is no planned closure, and on the contrary, without pun intended, we are conducting a policy of openness in the countries which welcome us. ” . The goal is to “train more” in number, but also in quality (with our special forces for example) and to provide new “tailor-made” support in the face of new needs (such as rehabilitation centers for combatants engaged in the fight against terrorism). IThis is not a setback for France even if the deployments will be revised downwards, but it is a question of being “present differently .” ” There is a historic opportunity to maintain an equally assertive military presence, but which takes on a different shape”, while France’s projection capabilities will be reinforced at the same time.
5. Funding the defense industrial base (BITD in French for “Base industrielle et technologique de défense”)
A real challenge, funding the defense industrial base is at the center of many initiatives underway, among which the sensitization of banking institutions to finance SMEs which applications are too often rejected because they belong to the armament sector.
6. The question of the SNU – “Service national universel” or Universal conscription
This initiative is inseparable from the policy of the Ministry of the Armed Forces in human resources in general, as it faces a problem in retaining manpower rather than a problem in recruiting. Sébastien Lecornu underlined the current transformation of the format of the armed forces, which will soon count one reserve soldier for two active soldiers. Such a challenge needs to be met with the imperative of being able to train, equip and motivate reservists.
7. French military assistance to Ukraine
Military assistance to Ukraine is currently based on two pillars: artillery on the one hand (in particular with a full-service Caesar solution), ground-air defense on the other hand (with a proven success rate of Crotale systems). Nothing is taboo, but the pressure on France and allies in general currently focuses mainly on ammunition and shells.
8. Reaffirming France’s role in NATO
It is important to explain France’s place within the Atlantic Alliance, because of France’s singular position on strategic autonomy and insofar as there is a form of ” naive anti-americanism [dans certains milieux] (…) which gives way to all kinds of unfunded interpretations of the Gaullian thinking.” For Sébastien Lecornu, a little recall in history and efforts in pedagogy are necessary, if only to clarify general de Gaulle’s decision to leave the military institutions of NATO in 1966, the interpretation of which is sometimes the subject of political shortcuts. France’s reintegration into NATO’s military institutions under President Sarkozy must also be re-explained, in particular in regard to the fact that France retains its nuclear autonomy. Evolving towards a European concept of vital interests the way France conceives it in the context of its deterrence is one of the topics for debate. Not a well-known fact, France is not only the fourth largest financial contributor to NATO, but the second largest contributor in terms of military contribution and effective provision of resources – equipment, staff, and so on – compared to the procurement pledge each member country commits to NATO on a yearly basis. To be noted as well is the fact that the United States act as the framework nation in Poland and France does teh same in Romania, both on the Ukrainian borders. “What is promised is done” and, at the end of the day, that is what matters.
[1] See the introduction to the LPM 2024-2030: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/loi-programmation-militaire-2024-2030-grandes-orientations
[2] See the full speech (in French)https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/287928-emmanuel-macron-20012023-politique-de-defense